Battle of Pyongtaek

A reconnaissance team sent north on the evening of July 5 reported seeing tanks south of Osan. The team attempted to destroy a tank it spotted in the village of Sojong but was unsuccessful; it suffered one killed (Private Kenneth R. Shadrick) and was forced to return to Pyongtaek.^[20] Shortly after, several survivors from Task Force Smith arrived at 1st Battalion's command post telling stories of their defeat at Osan, but Ayres did not believe they were accurate. Brigadier General George B. Barth, acting division artillery commander for the 24th Infantry Division, stopped by the command post and ordered that the battalion hold only as long as it could, and not to risk being flanked or surrounded, wary of the defeat at Osan.^[21] Barth then moved to the 34th Infantry Regiment's command where he ordered regimental commander Colonel Jay B. Lovless to consolidate the Regiment at Cheonan to the south. Lovless subsequently moved 3rd Battalion south, without having ever engaged the enemy.^[17] Barth believed the 34th Infantry would not be able to defend Pyongtaek as long as the 21st Infantry defended Osan.^[18] From 3rd Battalion, L Company was detached and ordered to hold south of Pyongtaek to cover the 1st Battalion when it retreated. This order was not carried out, and L Company left for Chonan.^[22]

Having pushed back Task Force Smith at Osan, the North Korean 4th Infantry Division, supported by elements of the North Korean 105th Armored Division, continued their advance down the Osan-Pyongtaek road, up to 12,000 men strong under division commander Lee Kwon Mu in two infantry regiments supported by dozens of tanks.^[12][23] Barth, who had been with Task Force Smith as an observer, had ordered the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry to hold until the North Koreans threatened to envelop them, then to fall back to successive positions south, delaying the North Korean force as long as possible.^[24] At midnight on July 5, several more survivors of Task Force Smith streamed into the battalion's lines. At 0300 on July 6, the battalion destroyed a small bridge over a stream 600 yards (550 m) north of its position.^[25]

Rain and fog were heavy throughout the morning of July 6, and visibility was limited for the emplaced troops.^[18] Just after daybreak, 13 North Korean T-34 tanks were spotted stopped at the bridge. Following them were two columns of infantry. The American forces originally believed that they might be survivors of Task Force Smith until they realized the forces were deploying in numbers too great, and began preparing to attack the unsuspecting North Koreans.^[26] The battalion's commander ordered mortar fire on the North Korean forces, causing them to disperse as the lead tank began firing on the positions of A Company, on a hill southwest of the road. Mortar fire destroyed a truck, but a round from a North Korean tank stunned the artillery observer and no one took his place in the confusion, ending the American mortar attack.^[23][27] North Korean forces immediately began advancing on A Company's position, but the company was not able to return fire effectively, with fewer than half of its soldiers using their weapons. For several minutes only squad and platoon leaders shot back while the rest of the soldiers hid in their foxholes.^[28] Within fifteen minutes, B Company was able to return fire effectively, and by this time the North Korean forces had advanced steadily toward 1st Battalion's position.^[23] Later examinations found many American soldiers' weapons were assembled incorrectly or were dirty or broken.^[25] The Americans had nothing with which to fight the tanks, and were unable to do anything to stop them.^[29]

As North Korean soldiers advanced, they began to envelop both A and B Companies, and 30 minutes after the first shots were fired, both companies were ordered to withdraw, one platoon at a time.^[30] C Company, kept in reserve during the engagement, retreated without coming in contact with North Korean forces. A Company, under the heaviest attack, attempted a gradual withdrawal which quickly became disorderly, as men ran from the hill, some without weapons and ammunition, being strafed by North Korean machine guns the entire time. Panic quickly overtook many of the men of the battalion, and they started running past the designated rally points, all the way to Pyongtaek. Others, too scared to retreat, remained in their foxholes and were captured by the North Korean forces.^[31] One officer attempted to stay behind and search for survivors, before he and three others were allegedly captured and executed by North Korean forces.^[26][32] Company commanders gathered what men they could and began moving south, though one-fourth of 1st Battalion was killed, missing or captured immediately after the brief fight. The retreating elements left a trail of equipment behind, littering the road back to Pyongtaek with ammunition, helmets, and rain gear.^[26] In the disorderly retreat one platoon from A Company was left behind, and had to retreat through a railway for cover.^[33]

The battalion regrouped at Pyongtaek itself, mostly a mass of disorganized soldiers without leadership.^[34] Engineers with the battalion demolished a bridge north of the town before moving south. The remains of A Company then headed for Cheonan, regrouping there with the rest of the 1st and 3rd Battalions which had also withdrawn. Though a few jeeps and trucks were found and commandeered, most of the retreat was carried out on foot. A few scattered artillery shells landed around the retreating force, but North Korean soldiers did not aggressively pursue them.^[35] By noon the disorganized remains of the 34th Infantry had outrun all enemy fire and were out of immediate danger.^[36]

The soldiers, most of their equipment missing, made no attempt at further delaying actions, and were unable to communicate with other units because their radio equipment had been lost.^[37] As they were retreating, an American aircraft accidentally strafed the column, injuring one South Korean soldier moving with them, further demoralizing the soldiers.^[29][36] The 34th Infantry Regiment began to set up a new line south of Chonan by nightfall, even though many of its men no longer had equipment to fight with.^[11]

General Dean, the divisional commander, was angered by the poor performance of the 34th Infantry Regiment during the battle. He allegedly was upset that the regiment retreated so quickly without attempting to further delay the North Koreans. He considered ordering the regiment back north immediately but did not do so for fear of ambush.^[11] Dean replaced the commander of the 34th Infantry, Colonel Lovless, and ordered the 3rd Battalion back north, but when it encountered North Korean resistance it immediately became disorganized and was forced to withdraw.^[37] The engagement at Pyongtaek had caused a significant decline in morale among American forces fighting on the peninsula, and this would continue until victories at Inchon and the Pusan Perimeter allowed them to go on the offensive.^[29] Dean took the blame for the defeat himself, and historians consider him at least partially at fault for expecting one inexperienced battalion to hold the line against a numerically superior enemy who was well-trained.^[11][20]

The regiment was forced to regroup at Cheonan and oppose the North Korean forces again, and it suffered heavy casualties before being forced to withdraw after the Battle of Cheonan. The 24th Infantry Division would continue to fight in delaying actions such as this one for two more weeks until it was overwhelmed at the Battle of Taejon, however by that time the Pusan Perimeter would be in place, and other US divisions would be able to hold the line for several more months during the Battle of Pusan Perimeter until the Inchon Landings, when American forces would finally defeat the North Korean Army, ending the first phase of the war.^[38][39]

36°59′36″N 127°5′46″E / 36.99333°N 127.09611°E / 36.99333; 127.09611 (Pyongtaek)