Battle of Sabha (2019)

On January 16, 2019, the Libyan National Army (LNA) announced the launch of its offensive.^[16][17][18] The operation was carried out in coordination with the Chadian government and with the support of France, but it was viewed with concern by Algeria.^[14][16] The United States did not react.^[19] The offensive was launched from the Tamenhant Airbase, about 30 kilometers north of Sebha, the largest city in southern Libya. However, LNA units had already taken up positions around Sebha in the preceding days.^[17]

The stated objective of the LNA was to “ensure the security of the inhabitants of the southwest against terrorists, whether from ISIS or al-Qaeda, as well as criminal gangs.”^[17] It also claimed to seek to secure oil sites and the routes linking the south to the north, and to combat illegal immigration.^[17] In a statement, it called on local militias to evacuate the military sites they occupied.^[17]

In January, the LNA entered the city of Sebha with little difficulty, announcing its capture on January 19.^[16][20][21] Full control of the last parts of the city was not achieved until January 24.^[22]

On January 27, the LNA claimed to have seized the region of Ghadduwah, 80 kilometers south of Sebha.^[16][22] At dawn on February 1, Chadian rebels launched an attack on Ghadduwah.^[16] At least three LNA members were killed, including two officers.^[16]

Haftar’s forces also surrounded the city of Murzuq, held by the Toubou.^[21] The operation was poorly received by local Toubou populations. The Toubou National Assembly condemned the offensive, and Libyan Toubou deputies suspended their participation in the House of Representatives in Tobruk.^[18] It also demanded explanations for statements by the LNA spokesperson accusing the tribe of “collusion with foreign forces.”^[18] Previously allied with Haftar, the Toubou appeared increasingly divided.^[18]

On January 18, 2019, the LNA announced that it had killed Abu Talha al-Libi [fr], a senior leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.^[23][24] Abu Talha al-Libi was reportedly killed along with two other jihadists during an assault on two houses in the al-Qarda al-Shatti area, about 60 kilometers northeast of Sebha.^[23][24]

On February 3, 121 Nigerien Toubou rebels from the Movement for Justice and the Rehabilitation of Niger (MJRN), led by Mahamat Tinaymi, left Libya and surrendered to the Niger Armed Forces at Madama.^[25] A disarmament ceremony took place in Dirkou on February 11.^[26]

Based south of Murzuq, Chadian rebels of the Union of Resistance Forces also chose to leave southern Libya rather than fight Haftar’s troops.^[5][21] After entering Chadian territory, their column was targeted by the French Air Force in the Ennedi desert between February 3 and 6.^[21] Around twenty vehicles were destroyed, and between 100 and 250 fighters surrendered to Chadian government forces.^[21][27]

On February 6, the LNA announced that it had seized the al-Sharara oil field near Ubari, the largest in the country, accounting for roughly one-third of Libya’s oil production. The site had been closed since December 10 and was previously controlled by Tuareg militias.^[14][18][19] This seizure came only hours after the Government of National Accord announced the deployment of Petroleum Facilities Guards to al-Sharara.^[18] The Tuareg were divided, and several of their battalions joined the LNA.^[14][19]

The GNA remained without a response for several weeks.^[18] LNA forces were relatively well received by local populations,^[19] and according to Le Monde, most observers attributed Haftar’s advances around Sebha to widespread local disillusionment with the Tripoli authorities.^[14] On February 6, the GNA Presidential Council issued a statement declaring that the fight against terrorism should be conducted through coordination among state security institutions rather than hasty operations.^[18] The same day, to counter Haftar’s advance, Fayez al-Sarraj appointed the Tuareg Ali Kanna, a former Gaddafi-era officer, as commander of the “Southern Military Zone.”^[14][18][21] UN envoy Ghassan Salamé expressed concern about the “risk of escalation of violence.”^[18]

On February 13, according to the GNA, a U.S. airstrike was carried out near Ubari against al-Qaeda.^[19] The United States denied the following day that it had conducted any raid in Libya.^[28]

On the morning of February 20, the LNA entered the city of Murzuq and fought clashes with Chadian rebels.^[29][30] The LNA claimed control of the city later that day, while stating that combat units were still pursuing remaining Chadian opposition fighters.^[22] That evening, Ibrahim Mohamad Kari, a Toubou general and head of local security, was assassinated by what the GNA Interior Ministry described as an “outlaw armed group.”^[30]

On February 21, the LNA announced that it had “peacefully” taken control of the al-Fil oil field.^[31]

On May 4, the Islamic State attacked an LNA barracks in Sebha, killing nine people.^[32]

In late July 2019, while the LNA was engaged in the Battle of Tripoli (2019–2020), troops known as the “Southern Protection Force,” supported by the GNA and commanded by the Toubou leader Moussa Hassan al-Tabaoui, took control of Murzuq.^{[33][34][35][36]} The violence left dozens dead, and 2,150 civilians fled the city according to the United Nations.^[35] On August 5, the LNA claimed responsibility for an airstrike on Murzuq targeting “Chadian opposition fighters,”^[36] stating that Moussa Hassan al-Tabaoui had been wounded.^[33][34] Local officials and the GNA, however, accused the LNA of bombing civilians gathered in a government building, with reported casualties of at least 42 to 43 killed and 51 to 60 wounded.^[36][37] RFI reported uncertainty over the identity of the victims but noted that photographs from the hospital showed several bodies of young men in military fatigues.^[34] On August 11, the LNA re-entered the city, but soon clashed again with Chadian and Toubou fighters.^[35]

According to Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya specialist and researcher at the Clingendael Institute: “In one month, Haftar turned everything upside down; the political process was swept aside. The marshal intends to demonstrate, to Libyans as well as to his external backers, that he is delivering a flawless military performance and to continue his advance toward Tripoli by relying on his military legitimacy to attract defections. If he succeeds, Haftar could establish himself in Tripoli even before a national conference is held and before presidential and legislative elections are organized.”^[19]