Draft:Jassi Pannu

Pandemic preparedness

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Pannu worked as a front-line physician in California and Uganda.^[2] She contributed to the Apollo Program for Biodefense, published by the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, which proposed a 10-year sustained investment of $100 billion in biodefense science and technology research.^[3][4] Pannu has argued that prevention technologies are underfunded but could successfully be used to prevent pandemics before they begin,^[5][6] and has said reusable respirators are superior to single-use respirators in pandemic conditions.^[7] Her role in the Apollo project and views on promising pandemic prevention technologies are profiled in the book Moral Ambition by Rutger Bregman.^[8][9] Pannu has studied how pandemic vaccines can become securitized and used as tools of soft power^[10], a recognized trend during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Biosafety and dual-use research

During the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy's revision of gain-of-function research policies, also referred to as dual use research of concern (DURC), Pannu led an effort to advocate for increased biosafety and biosecurity oversight of pathogen research due to pandemic risks with Tom Inglesby, David Relman and 34 signatories.^[11] The group's recommendations were published in the journal Science and proposed expansion of the scope of pathogens to be governed, noting that per existing policies, enhancement research on pathogens with properties similar to the SARS-CoV-2 virus would not have met criteria for governance.^[12][13]

Following the discovery of an undocumented biolab containing high-risk pathogens in Reedley, California, Pannu expressed concern regarding limited oversight of some private laboratories handling pandemic pathogens.^[14] She and colleagues dubbed these "invisible" biolabs that fall through the cracks of government oversight.^[15]

Mirror Life

In 2024, Pannu joined a a working group of 38 international scientists and researchers cochaired by Nobel laureate Jack W. Szostak and John Glass to address the emerging risk of mirror life, in particular, of synthetic mirror bacteria with flipped molecular chirality.^{[16][17][18][19]} The group warned that such organisms, if synthetically created, could pose a unique ecological and biosecurity threat if released into the environment; the group recommended government oversight of related research. These recommendations prompted international public attention to a previously niche research field^{[20][21][22][23]} as well as international government attention given the significant risks noted^[24][25][26].

Artificial Intelligence

Pannu’s research on the biosecurity implications of AI has been used to inform federal policy. She has provided expert testimony to the United States Congress on advancements in artificial intelligence for biological research, and the implications of these advancements for both strengthening biosecurity as well as creating novel biosecurity risks.^[27][28] Pannu and colleagues have argued that, as of 2024, AI models do not "substantially contribute" to biological risk, but note that future systems could be used to engineer pandemic-capable pathogens.^[29][30][31] Her research on this topic^[32] has been cited in the International AI Safety Report^[33] and by the European Commission^[34]

Pannu served on a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine committee sponsored by the National Science Foundation investigating the benefits and risks of dual-use artificial intelligence approaches for the design of biological systems.^[35] The committee noted that a tiered approach was needed to identify which in silico research posed a higher risk of misuse, and that existing dual use research of concern frameworks could be used as a basis for such tiers.

Pannu led an effort to propose virology data governance as a viable approach to preventing open source models from being used to design pandemic pathogens. The framework, published in Science, is inspired by the internationally used biosafety level system. It proposes Biosecurity Data Levels (BDLs) with tiered access controls for sensitive pathogen data.^[36][37]. The BDL system arose from recommendations from attendees of the 50th anniversary Asilomar conference^[38], where scientists gathered to discuss modern-day biosecurity risks including AI^[39].