Pro-Beijing camp (Taiwan)

Both the pro-Beijing camp and the pan-Blue Coalition support "One China"; while the pan-Blue Coalition defines the Republic of China as "One China", but reject unification under the PRC, the pro-Beijing camp recognize the People's Republic of China as the definition of "One China" and the CCP as the rightful ruler of Taiwan. However, some political parties, such as the pro-Beijing New Party, do not deny the Republic of China and support peaceful unification with the People's Republic of China, with both sides pursuing either a confederation or a Hong Kong/Macau political model.

In 2022, the Director of Taiwan's National Security Bureau stated that the Chinese Communist Party provides training to local online influencers as part of its "cognitive warfare" for political propaganda.^[2] In 2023, the Republic of China's Mainland Affairs Council stated in a report that the CCP was increasing its cross-strait propaganda efforts in Taiwan through cognitive warfare.^[3]

According to Sinologist Gerry Groot, the erosion of the "one country, two systems" framework in Hong Kong had a profound impact on Taiwan's political landscape. Following the 2020 enactment of the National Security Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress—a response to mass demonstrations and dissent in Hong Kong—Groot argues that the "clear and effective end of Hong Kong's judicial independence" occurred twenty-seven years ahead of schedule. This perceived abrogation of CCP promises was closely observed in Taiwan, where it "made the work of the tiny minority of pro-unification activists even harder and reinforced the skepticism of others regarding the value of CCP promises." Furthermore, Groot notes that these developments in Hong Kong played a crucial role in the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, aiding the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen while undermining the campaign of the Kuomintang candidate, Han Kuo-yu.^[4]

The organized crime groups in Taiwan, driven by financial incentives also support the PRC unification efforts.^[5][6]

In Taiwanese political standards, Taiwanese–Chinese nationalism has been regarded as right/conservative and Taiwan independence movement as left/progressive; the pro-Beijing camp is also called the "radical pro-unification factions" (急統派) and is considered "far-right" (極右); because the PRC is a one-party dictatorship and authoritarian nationalist regime as Taiwan is a liberal democracy.^[1]

Individuals or groups belonging to pro-Beijing camp are often referred to as "anti-American",^[7][8] sometimes as "anti-Japanese"^[9] and "anti-South Korean".^[10][11] Some commentators point out that the survival of Han ethnic nationalism within Taiwanese society provides an opening for Beijing's political division tactics.^[12]

Kuomintang continues to be opposed to communism, as anti-communism is written under Article 2 of Kuomintang's party charter. However, some politicians, including Hung Hsiu-chu, are classified as "pro-Beijing".^[13][14] Although the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) positions itself as a centrist party, its cooperative relationship with the PRC has prompted belief that it aligns more closely with conservatism.^[15][16]