Talk:Process philosophy

In Section 4.2 regarding philosophy and medicine this statement is made: "The philosophy of medicine began to deviate somewhat from scientific method and an emphasis on repeatable results in the very late 20th century by embracing population thinking . . ." Nevertheless, there is no definition or explanation to what "population thinking" may be. There is a hyperlink to the entry "Mental Health" but no explanation is found in the text of this entry either. So the reader is left concluding that the Philosophy of Medicine has deviated by accepting Population Thinking but is not allowed to know what that Population Thinking is nor just how it deviates from whatever conventional medical philosophy might be. LAWinans (talk) 18:28, 28 November 2017 (UTC)

"He understood quantum theory, even to the point of developing a Theory of Relativity similar to Einstein’s." This sentence is ambiguous. If Whitehead's theory of relativity is a physical theory of relativity like Einstein's, it is unrelated to his understanding of quantum mechanics. If it is an analogous philosophical theory with the same name as Einstein's physical theory, it is unrelated to his understanding of quantum mechanics, and also unrelated to Einstein. This should be clarified. -- Anon, (15 December 2004)

This was clarified in the article by Aliman on 20 December 2004. The anonymous writer is correct in that relativity, as presently understood is unrelated to quantum theory. However, he probably does not know that Whitehead was a consumate mathematician of his day, and did formulate his relativity theory in mathematical terms, albeit unrelated to Einstein's principle of equivalence. Whitehead's theory, rather than understanding matter warping spacetime as Einstein did, proposed (roughly) that gravity bent light rays in flat space. Whitehead's 1922 theory was mostly overlooked until the 1960s, and is thought by some to have been disproved in 1972. (see the Wiki entry on Alfred North Whitehead or external website at Whitehead/Einstein Relativity Comparison). Ironically, Anon is assuming the either/or Cartesian split between the physical and the metaphysical (or philosophical) realms, which Whitehead explicitly rejected. Whitehead's philosophy is generalized from his physics, not separate from it. --Blainster 13:25, 4 Mar 2005 (UTC)

1. I think that Process Philosophy does deserve an independent article. Whitehead is a thinker of sufficient renown and repute that his metaphysics deserves a place on this website---nor is process philosophy at all synonymous with the philosophical treatment of organism. One is basic ontology while the other represents a much higher order problem---one is foundational and the other is not. 2. The claims in the "Process Philosophy After Whitehead" section that refer to medicine are completely unsourced: I would say that Foucault has had no influence on medicine---and, even if he has, Foucault is not a follower of Whitehead's metaphysics. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.55.205.125 (talk) 16:57, 16 March 2008 (UTC)

The current version has a flatly incorrect discussion of relativity. Special relativity emerged in 1905 and deals with non-accelerating objects in a fixed flat space background. General relativity emerged in 1915 and deals with accelerating objects in a curved and dynamical spacetime. The idea of an expanding universe is also logically independent of general relativity, and only emerged some years later with investigation of possible cosmological models in the light of [Hubble]'s measurements of 1929. Like much else in the article the current discussion is mush. --Tdent 20:35, 29 October 2006 (UTC)

"In 1905, the theory of general relativity curtailed exploration of pure process views and made the case for a specific and expanding universe that did exist as an objective object of our human perception and cognition." Is incorrect...try 1915, as the hyperlink correctly tells you. 198.97.67.57 18:24, 29 November 2006 (UTC) radar-mark, 29 Nov 2006

The equations for Einstein's general relativity (GR) have many solutions; hence GR is compatible with a (infinite?) number of scenarios for the origin and ultimate fate of the universe. The solution Einstein focussed implied a static universe. He did not contemplate an initial singularity followed by expansion (now called the Big Bang); that was first proposed by Alexander Friedmann in 1922, in work little noticed. A few years later, Georges Lemaitre showed that a Big Bang was consistent with Einstein's mathematics; see Friedmann-Lemaitre-Robertson-Walker metric. 2 years later, completely independently, Edwin Hubble empirically confirmed the expansion of the universe. That expansion is consistent with GR, but unlike Eddington's 1919 eclipse observations, cannot be taken as an experimental verification thereof. GR is indifferent as to whether the universe is melioristic; Frank Tipler's Omega Point (Tipler) theory is not. In any event, the connection between GR and process metaphysics is completely unclear. The connection between the Omega Point and process thought is, to my mind, intuitively evident, but to my knowledge has yet to be made in print.123.255.28.93 (talk) 04:34, 29 November 2008 (UTC)

Would this article be an appropriate place to add information about non-Whiteheadian approaches, e.g. Johanna Seibt's theory, Sellarsian stuff, etc? I know 'process philosophy' is often taken as synonymous with 'Whiteheadian philosophy' but it seems to me it may also function as an umbrella term including other approaches. Would anyone be opposed to the addition of a section on non-Whiteheadian approaches? Countermereology 15:08, 12 February 2007 (UTC)

Absolutely, and without a shadow of a doubt Whitehead would have agreed with this suggestion. The idea of process philosophy being a personal project or being under the intellectual ownership of Whitehead solo would have repulsed him, I have little doubt. Whitehead was a great contributor to this field, probably the greatest since the 17th century, but there have been many, many others, Spinoza being a salient example. Brigantian (talk) 00:08, 8 December 2007 (UTC)

This article includes a very large number of attribution of views to persons seemingly in the service of establishing the credentials of process philosophy. Virtually none of the attributions are substantiated by citations. Some of the attributions are controversial. Here are some concrete examples of worrisome passages in the article:

René Descartes, for instance, proposed that the mind and body were actually connected and unified by a single process, the imagination. This was often discarded or devalued by Descartes' followers and critics who attributed to him (incorrectly) advocating a mind-body dualism.

Perhaps, contrary to common understanding Descartes was not a dualist. But this would need substantiation. Notice that in the above quote, it is the mind and the body that are connected - the most natural way of understanding this is that in Descartes' ontology substances like minds and bodies are fundamental which then somehow get connected.

Very similarly, the law of the excluded middle was raised to ontological status by those of Aristotle's followers, notably those practicing medieval scholasticism, who wished to ignore some of his telling observations about moderation (the very ones that Francis Bacon celebrated) and rhetoric (which Aristotle praised, seemingly foreshadowing Descartes' imagination).

What is an ontological status? And before the law of excluded middle was raised to that status, what status did it have? What are the telling observations about moderation that Bacon celebrated? Maybe there are such observations but the reader needs to be told what they are. Finally, I'm not sure anyone practiced scholasticism.

A number of other key Enlightenment figures ... made note of their working processes in terms that suggest change is what they seek to quantify because it is the most fundamental basis on which perception and thus reality proceeds.

Citations? Are we sure that they did not see change as changes of objects such that the objects that are changing are not themselves changes? Process philosophy is not simply the view that processes are important - that 's a boring and uncontroversial claim - but the far more radical claim that changes are ontologically fundamental in the sense that they are not to be understood as changes of things that are not themselves changes.

Of other philosophers, more dominant at that time, Immanuel Kant noted that either experience made objects possible, or objects made experience possible. He seemed to have missed that processes might make both possible.

How might processes make both possible? Which processes are we talking about here? Might the process of digestion make possible both experience and objects?

These hopes proved vain, although it remained for Russell and Whitehead to prove that so in 1913

Which hopes? And what exactly did Russell and Whitehead prove in 1913?

Since, it is argued, free will is inherent to the nature of the universe, God is not omnipotent in Whitehead's metaphysics.

it is argued by who?

other process philosophers have questioned Whitehead's theology, seeing it as a regressive Platonism.

Who are these other philosophers? Quatsch77 19:36, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

I heartily concur that this entry is a philosophical muddle, starting with the claim that Principia Mathematica proved or disproved anything about the foundations of mathematics. Principia 's set theory is damned, because it was innocent of any axioms except an equivalent of the axiom of choice. In particular, it ignored the now-canonical ZF axioms published in 1908. All relations were primitive, because both editions of Principia were innocent of the set-theoretic definitions of the ordered pair, including the non-canonical one Kurotowski proposed in 1921. Principia committed many philosophical sins, starting with the confusion of use and mention (see Ivor Grattan-Guinness 2000). In my opinion, Whitehead turned to metaphysics because he was disappointed with Principia. Tellingly, he had nothing to do with the 1927 second edition.123.255.28.93 (talk) 04:51, 29 November 2008 (UTC)

Here are some more infelicities:

Process philosophy ... does not characterize change as illusory but as the cornerstone of metaphysical reality, or ontology

This insinuates that philosophical views other than process philosophy hold that change is somehow unreal. But it is one thing to hold that changes are not the most basic elements of ontology, quite another thing to hold that changes are illusory, just as it is one thing to say that tables are made from fundamental particles, quite another thing to say that the existence of tables is illusory.

This resulted in the most famous work of process philosophy—Alfred North Whitehead's Process and Reality. - a work which can be seen as a lighter and more accessible form of describing the basic Hegelian truth, namely that absolute, or "philosophical", truth can only be a logical and /or worldly "movement" in and through determinates, not these deteminates as fixed concepts or "things". Hegel is the real (modern) rootsource of what (clumsily) can be termed dialectical-dynamical-ontology, and of which process philosophy is a branch.

This needs some serious reworking before it is intelligible. Whitehead's work is lighter and more accessible than what? Why is truth is qualified as 'absolute' or 'philosophical'? Are there unphilosophical and relative truths? And are those other truths fixed concepts? What exactly does it mean to say that a truth is a concept, fixed or otherwise?

The process metaphysics elaborated in Process and Reality proposes that the fundamental elements of the universe are occasions of experience.

What is an 'occasion of experience'? Is it different from the plain experience? I'm sure there is a point in talking about occasions of experience, but the term here needs explaining.

Whitehead's philosophy resembles in some respects the monads of Leibniz.

Whitehead's philosophy does not resemble monads. For that matter, Leibniz's philosophy does not resemble monad's, either. As the next sentence suggests, this should probably be: occasions of experience resemble in some respects the monads of Leibniz.

These experiences may be summed in some sense but can only approximately be shared, even among very similar cognitions with identical DNA.

Cognitions don't have DNA. Quatsch77 19:33, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Anyone else think this section would be better placed on the Process Theology page (if it belongs anywhere at all - it isn't terribly insightful)? 75.81.190.157 02:34, 13 April 2007 (UTC)

GILLES DELEUZE, MANUEL DELANDA, BRIAN MASSUMI —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 87.78.155.202 (talk) 11:14, 29 April 2007 (UTC).

Came to say the same thing ~2025-32437-09 (talk) 01:07, 10 November 2025 (UTC)

In an attempt to remove the tags .... please place specific issues below. IF NOT, tags will be removed. J. D. Redding 20:37, 20 May 2007 (UTC)

The Philosophy of Organism article is brief, compararively useless without the information in this article, refers, in effect, to the same theory as that discussed on this page, and may contain information and references that are useful on this page. I propose a merge from 'Philosophy of Organism', with a redirect from that page to this. What do you think? Anarchia 21:38, 13 September 2007 (UTC)

If "philosophy of organism" is actually an expression used by Whitehead, then it should not be merged here, as process philosophy is not restricted to Whitehead (see Bergson, Deleuze, etc.). Spirals31 18:38, 8 November 2007 (UTC)

No. This page needs to stay but needs to be developed. It is certainly not limited to the "philosophy of organism" nor consumed by "process theology" It has connections to dialectics, pragmatism, semiotics etc. It is not limited to Whitehead's use.

• I agree with these other two editors. philosophy of organism should remain a separate article due to its origin as phrase of Alfred North Whitehead. --Firefly322 (talk) 22:02, 2 July 2008 (UTC)

Process philosophy has been discussed in "the East", especially India, for at least 2,500 years. The Buddhist idea of impermanence is one example. This could/should be noted in the History section. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.24.125.16 (talk) 21:30, 3 August 2011 (UTC)

The word change is defined in the Wikipedia article on Identity and change. But that article is written from a philosophical perspective that radically differs from that of process philosophy, so that that article's definition of change reads as nonsense from the viewpoint of the present article on Process philosophy. To link this present article to the one on Identity and change would be a mistake, because it would read as nonsense. To remedy this, one might wish to revise the article on Identity and change, but that is perhaps beyond duty of editors of the present article, and I am not attempting it. My solution for the present: remove the link.

According to Whitehead (Process and Reality, page 34), "how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is." Also (page 52), "Actual entities perish, but do not change; they are what they are." Thus it is not a very bad stretch of ordinary language to identify a Whiteheadian actual entity with a change, in the sense that a process may be regarded as a change, and also as a Whiteheadian actual entity. It does not make sense to say that "a change changes [itself]", or that "a process changes [itself]", although it does make sense in ordinary language to say that "a process changes something else".Chjoaygame (talk) 23:57, 7 December 2011 (UTC)

The term 'dynamism' that I have removed from the leading sentence is a specialized term of art, and as it is defined it does not give a good focus on the main idea of process philosophy. I have therefore replaced it with the ordinary language words 'change and development', deliberately not linked to Wikipedia disambiguation pages because they are intended as words of the ordinary language. In my judgment, they better summarize the intentions of process philosophy. I think that the summarizing function of the lead calls for a statement that is not specifically linked to a particular source. Whitehead writes of words "mutely appealing for an imaginative leap."Chjoaygame (talk) 23:52, 7 February 2012 (UTC)