Rao Ravindra, you have tried a couple of times to add the following passage:
Sheikh Abdullah came to Delhi and was staying in Nehru's residence when the-then Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, Mehr Chand Mahajan was meeting with Nehru and Sardar Patel on 26 October 1947 to persuade Nehru to send the air force immediately to Srinagar but Nehru was undecided. Mahajan threatened to leave but Sardar Patel asked him to stay. Sheikh Abdullah overheard the heated argument in the next room and sent a note to Nehru stating that he agreed with Mahajan. After seeing Abdullah's note, Nehru agreed to send the air force immediately (Extract from Mahajan’s autobiography ‘Looking Back’ published in 1963).[1] Thus Abdullah's note saved Srinagar and Kashmir. Abdullah wanted to head a civilian government in the state and was totally against Jinnah and opposed to the idea of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.
The problem with the passage is not that it is false. But rather that it is poorly sourced (a newspaper article describing an excerpt from an autobiography) and is WP:UNDUE in placing emphasis on one event. You need to study and understand the context in which this event occurs, and summarise the whole process. If you cannot access fancy sources, you can at least read the Wikipedia articles such as the Kashmir conflict and Timeline of the Kashmir conflict to get the full picture.
The Maharaja offered to accede to India for the first time on 19 September (which was a whole month before 26 October!). Nehru's reply was the Abdullah had to be released from prison and involved in the state government. Only then can an accession be offered. Nehru did not want to accept an accession from the ruler, who belonged to a minority community and whose accession would anyway be contested by all parties concerned. Rather he wanted the accession to come from the people.
It was in response to this demand that Abdullah was released and the ban on National Conference lifted (around 29 September). Abdullah, however, had not made up his mind about accession. He wanted the power to be transferred to people first (which meant that he had to become prime minister). One might regard that as self-serving, but if you think about it, it could not have been any other way. In order to offer accession, he had to have a position first. Secondly, the situation in the subcontinent was vastly different from what it was when he launched Quit Kashmir. There were now two dominions, and many Muslims of the state favoured accession to Pakistan. Moreover, the partition riots in the neighbouring Punjab had scared the people and turned them off from any association with India. Abdullah was not inimical to accession to Pakistan. However, Pakistan did not promise transfer of power to the people. It was happy to let the Maharaja continue as before. Moreover, Pakistan had its own client in the state, the Muslim Conference, which was rival to Abdullah. Considering everything, the best option for Abdullah was also to stay independent of both India and Pakistan.
This deadlock was broken by the Pakistani invasion of the state on 22 October. On the next day, the Maharaja again offered to accede to India while asking for military assistance.[1] Again Nehru was opposed. He wanted an immediate appointment of Abdullah in the government, and the accession offer as well as troops request to come to him. (Given that Abdullah was staying in Nehru's house at this time, we can imagine that he consulted him, we can assume that he agreed with this stand.[2]) Patel also thought that accession at this time would complicate matters. It was Mountbatten that needed accession. Without accession, he could not get the British commanding officers involved. They would have opposed it anyway. Menon was sent to negotiate this with the Maharaja on 25 October. He came back the following day and brought Mahajan with him.
So, on the morning of the 26 October, the discussion would have been about the appointment of Abdullah. He doesn't explain it clearly, but his wording is:
As a last resort I said, "Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and give whatever power you desire to the popular party. The army must fly to save Srinagar this evening or else I will go to Lahore and negotiate terms with Mr. Jinnah."
The "last resort" implies that he had argued for the troops to go first and the transfer of power to happen later. Abdullah, who listened to the argument sitting in adjoining room, agreed with this. So, it was the urgency of the situation, which the argument was about, and Abdullah accepted the urgency. The next day the troops were sent, and the Maharaja appointed Abdullah as the Emergency Administrator for the Valley.
That is, in essence, why we still have the Kashmir conflict till today. If Nehru's preferred sequence of events had been followed, the accession offer would have come from Abdullah, and it would have been much more difficult for anybody to contest it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:33, 13 December 2018 (UTC)
References
Whitehead, Andrew (2007), A Mission in Kashmir, Penguin, p. 103, ISBN 978-0-670-08127-1: "The letter R.L. Batra carried to Delhi is clear evidence that as soon as the maharaja learnt of the scale of the tribal invasion, he set in motion moves not simply to secure India’s military assistance but to accede."
