Talk:Line of Actual Control

Neil Shah-Quinn, can you explain why you removed the term "notional" in the lead sentence? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:48, 12 February 2021 (UTC)

• Kautilya3: thanks for asking! I think "notional demarcation line" is accurate but very complex language. I tried to explain it more gently by starting with the fact that it's a demarcation line (which I think is true, even if's a very fuzzy and debated one) and then in the next sentence explaining the important fact that its position is disputed. Perhaps we could change that second sentence to make it stronger? I am not super familiar with the sources here.—Neil Shah-Quinn (talk) 12:05, 12 February 2021 (UTC)
• As I think about it more, I see your point more strongly. I'm working on another edit now.—Neil Shah-Quinn (talk) 12:21, 12 February 2021 (UTC)
• Okay, done. I ended up changing a bunch of other things, but the main thing for this discussion is that I changed the first sentence to call the LAC a "boundary" rather than a "demarcation line". To me, "boundary" conveys a sence of fuzziness that "line" does not, and the link to demarcation line was not very helpful either because that article just seems like an arbitrary list of other geopolitical "lines". I also changed the next sentence to say it's "heavily disputed" rather than just that the sides "do not fully agree" because that more accurately reflects the heat involved. I hope you find this satisfactory, but if not, we can keep trying to find something better.—Neil Shah-Quinn (talk) 12:51, 12 February 2021 (UTC)

Thanks for the improvements. But, I am afraid "notional" is still needed, because it exists only as a notion. It has never been demarcated or agreed. In fact, China has not even told India where it believes the line is. (It thinks telling India where its line is amounts to a "concession"!) -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:06, 12 February 2021 (UTC)

Kautilya3: I certainly don't think we need to say notional. I have been reading more about this, and my takeaway is while yes, in some areas its position is not clear and in many or most areas its position has not been explicitly agreed by both sides, it is for most purposes (certainly for the purposes of a single intro sentence) more than a notion. This is in line with how most sources treat it. How would you feel about "disputed border"? Unlike "notional boundary", which I did not see in any source, that phrase is used frequently.—Neil Shah-Quinn (talk) 17:55, 12 February 2021 (UTC)

Neil Shah-Quinn, I agree that the need for "notional" has reduced, once the "demarcation line" term is removed. But I believe you still do not understand the situation correctly. Your text below is still not supported by the sources:

• Where is any source saying that it is "poorly demarcated"? On the contrary, the first source has said "it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground". That is a far cry from "poorly demarcated". In fact, the same journalist has tweeted this: "The best line I have heard on the LAC in Ladakh was from a recently retired former Indian ambassador to China in an off the record conversation: "There is no LAC. Period. There is no mutually agreed line. And either side can thus make any claims it wants.""
• "Disputed" is clear, but it is not only disputed in skirmishes. Even without skirmishes, the patrols of the two sides often run into each other and dispute it. There are standard procedures devised for how they should dispute it!
• Skirmishes occur, not because of disputes, but because one side, generally China, decides to hammer down its idea of the LAC. (In a way, that is also how the 1962 war happened. It was "claim line" at that time, rather than the LAC, but the modalities were the same.)

You really need to come to grips with the "notional" aspect. Here is one source:

The entire length of the 4,056 km Sino-Indian border is disputed by China and exists today as a notional Line of Actual Control. This line is not marked on the ground, and the two countries do not share a common perception of where the line runs. There are several places where India and China have differing interpretations on where even this notional line runs. Both sides patrol up to the limit of their respective interpretation. India describe Chinese efforts to patrol up to their interpretation of the line as ‘transgressions’. The media, however, freely use the more dramatic ‘incursions’.^[1]

Moreover, this ambiguity is part of China's policy:

Chinese officials do not want to engage in legal and political battles on the clarification of the LAC, which had been a priority with India before 2003 (the year when New Delhi formally recognized Tibet as a part of China). Despite the historical prominence and importance of the LAC, since 2008, clarification of the LAC has been removed from official bilateral documents.^[2]

So, China does not want to agree an LAC. It will either live with the ambiguity or try to hammer it down when it pleases. Under these circumstances, it is not acceptable to pretend that there is in fact an LAC. The term "notional" is the right way of making it clear. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:47, 13 February 2021 (UTC)

DiplomatTesterMan, the phrase "a certain sanctity" is used to explain the deception in polite language. If you want to call it deception, please go ahead. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:38, 17 February 2021 (UTC)

Kautilya3, I had changed M. Fisher to L. Menon because of the citation that Fisher uses. The citation directs to Menon's article in the National Herald dated 1963. Further, Fisher starts off the sentence with "For India...". Therefore writing that only Fisher writes this is partly misleading. This isn't a big point or big issue. Retaining only Fisher can be seen as plausible, but I thought best to clarify. DTM (talk) 06:46, 18 February 2021 (UTC)

India is a party in the dispute and so are any Indian officials. Fisher is a WP:THIRDPARTY. You are downgrading the claim by changing the attribution. Fisher writes:

For India, the determination of the line from which the Chinese were to withdraw was of crucial importance since in this sector Chinese maps over the years had shown steadily advancing claims, with quite different lines each identified as "the line of actual control as of 7 November 1959"

I don't see the italicised part as being attributed to India. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:19, 18 February 2021 (UTC)

In the Fisher-coauthored book, we find:

In fact, the Chinese claim that their 1956 and 1960 maps were "equally valid" was soon used to define the 1959 "line of actual control" as essentially the border shown on the 1960 map-thus incorporating several thousand additional square miles, some of which had not been seized until after the hostilities had broken out in October, 1962.^[1]

So, it is not as if Fisher didn't know and needed and Indian minister to tutor her!

And, Hoffman says:

In some places the line still went beyond the territory that the invading Chinese army had reached.[3: Times of India, 27, 28 Nov 1962, statement by Law Minister Asoke Sen, TOI, 28 Nov 1962]^[2]

This is the case in particular, in Depsang Bulge, where the so-called "1959 line" is beyond any posititon reached by the Chinese. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:37, 18 February 2021 (UTC)

Does Lines of Actual Control need to be created, redirected to this page? DTM (talk) 13:06, 21 July 2021 (UTC)

I don't think so. It would be misleading to start speaking of "Lines" (in plural), since the various versions are minor variations (at least on a macro scale). But, I think there is room to mention the various controversial bits and the de facto deviations from it. There are too many perhaps! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:22, 26 November 2021 (UTC)