2026 Hungarian parliamentary election

Hungary under Viktor Orbán

Orbán, the president of Fidesz since 2003 (he was previously the party leader from 1993 to 2000) and the co-president of the Fidesz–KDNP alliance formed in 2005, served as Prime Minister of Hungary from 1998 to 2002 and again from 2010 onwards,^[1][2][3] making him the longest tenured leader in the European Union.^[4] His government promoted Christian nationalism.^[1][2] During his rule, Hungary underwent major constitutional, political, and institutional changes that led many observers to describe it as a hybrid regime, or illiberal democracy,^[5] that blends democracy with authoritarianism as it moved away from the rule of law.^[6][7] In a 2014 speech, Orbán himself described Hungary under his rule as an "illiberal state".^[8][9][10] Initially a liberal during the 1990s and early 2000s, he eventually evolved his politics closer to the radical right and the far-right,^[11][12][13] being widely considered one of the leaders of the global far-right.^[13]

The 2026 election was scheduled for 12 April,^[14] the same day of the successful 2003 Hungarian EU membership referendum.^[15] The major opposition came from Magyar and his Tisza Party, a centre-right and pro-European political party.^[16][17] Politico Europe described it as the most important election in the EU in 2026,^[18] while DW News described the election as a referendum on whether Hungary would continue to drift towards authoritarianism and Russia or change course towards liberal democracy and the EU.^[19] Some analysts argued that Magyar had leaned into some core continuities with Fidesz—including the use of nationalist and populist rhetoric, skepticism about Ukraine's accession to the EU, and rejection of the EU migration and asylum pact—and that a Magyar government was likely to continue these policies.^[20] Prior to the election, an analysis by Eulytix of Tisza Party's voting record in the European Parliament showed that "while Tisza Party MEPs are mostly aligned with pro-EU forces, they also engage in tactical alignment with Fidesz on politically sensitive issues such as Ukraine, agriculture and migration."^[20]

2022 election

On 3 April 2022, with 54.13% of the popular vote, Fidesz–KDNP received the highest vote share by any party or alliance since 1990. It won two-thirds of the seats for the fourth time. The United for Hungary alliance suffered a massive defeat and was shortly after dissolved; its members sat in separate political groups in the National Assembly. From other minor parties, only Our Homeland Movement reached the threshold for entry, while Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party, Solution Movement, and Party of Normal Life did not.^[21] The European Parliament views Hungary as a "hybrid regime of electoral autocracy" since 2022 and considers Hungary according to Article 7.1 of the Treaty on European Union in clear risk of a serious breach of the Treaty on European Union.^[22][23] In January 2024, a majority of MEPs voted for a resolution demanding that the Council of the European Union consider that Hungary be stripped of its EU voting rights under Article 7 of the Treaty.^[24]

Rise of Tisza Party

On 2 February 2024, it was revealed that President Katalin Novák had granted a pardon in April 2023 to a criminal involved in a pedophilia case.^[25] The Novák scandal resulted in her resignation and that of former justice minister Judit Varga, who had countersigned the pardon.^[26] Not long after, Magyar (Varga's ex-husband) posted on Facebook that he would resign from all of his government-related positions, stating that the past few years had made him realize that the idea of a "national, sovereign, bourgeois Hungary" stated as the goal of Orbán's rule was in fact a "political product" serving to obscure massive corruption and transfers of wealth to those with the right connections.^[27]

On 15 March 2024, Magyar, despite initially refusing to participate in politics, held a rally attended by tens of thousands in Budapest at which he announced the formation of a new political party.^[28] According to polling conducted that month, around 15% of voters claimed they were "certain or highly likely" to vote for Magyar if he ran for office.^[29] On 10 April 2024, Magyar announced his bid to run in both the European Parliament and the General Assembly of Budapest with the then unknown Tisza Party, which finished in second place with nearly 30% of votes, the highest number and percentage of votes by any non-Fidesz party since the 2006 Hungarian parliamentary election. Following the 2024 European Parliament election in Hungary and the 2024 Budapest Assembly election, the strengthening of the Tisza Party continued and according to the independent/opposition-aligned polls, by the end of the year it had become the most popular political party in Hungary, or at least a close competitor to Fidesz, thus overturning the continuous dominance of ruling parties that had lasted since the Őszöd speech came to light.^[30][31]

The Tisza Party selected 103 of its 106 future candidates for the election in a two-round primary late 2025. The party put forward 3 nominees in each district and in the first round all Tisza Sziget members above the age of 16 could vote. Voting took place via a modified Borda count. In the second round, voting was opened also to all resident citizens above 18 who could vote for either of the two advancing candidates. Winners were announced on 28 November 2025.^[32]

Collapse of the previous opposition

Prior to the presidential pardon scandal, the Democratic Coalition was considered as the strongest opposition party; its leading member Klára Dobrev even formed a one-party shadow cabinet in September 2022, which clearly indicated the role of the main challenger against the other opposition parties;^[33] however, public opinion polls in the two years after the 2022 parliamentary election measured the party's support at a maximum of 20%. Except for the Momentum Movement, Our Homeland Movement and Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party, the opposition parties – Hungarian Socialist Party, Jobbik, Dialogue – The Greens' Party and LMP – Hungary's Green Party – usually did not reach the threshold according to public opinion polls.^[34][35] The two years after the 2022 election were characterized by frozen party relations and political apathy, similar to much of the Orbán era, which consisted of a dominant ruling Fidesz–KDNP and, far behind, the medium and small opposition parties competing with each other for a non-growing bloc of opposition voters.^[36] Moreover, the governance by decree, introduced due to the permanent "state of emergency" due to the COVID-19 pandemic and later the Russo-Ukrainian war, significantly eroded the political significance of the parliament.^[37]

The appearance and rapid advance of the Tisza Party completely rearranged the political party structure.^[35] A few days after Magyar announced his intention to found a party on 15 March 2024, the not-yet-formed political formation was polled at 15%.^[29] As a response, the Democratic Coalition concluded an electoral alliance with the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Dialogue – The Greens' Party on 28 March 2024. They agreed that the three parties will run on a unified Social Democrat–Green list, called DK–MSZP–Dialogue Alliance, in the upcoming European Parliament and local elections.^[38] The European Parliament election on 9 June 2024 was a complete disaster for the opposition parties; only DK–MSZP–Dialogue Alliance and Our Homeland Movement obtained mandates besides Fidesz–KDNP and Tisza Party, while the remaining parties – Momentum Movement, Hungarian Two-Tailed Dog Party, Jobbik, LMP – Hungary's Green Party, Second Reform Era Party, Everybody's Hungary People's Party and Solution Movement – did not. The Tisza Party's performance was characterized by the media as a challenge to the ruling political elite.^[39][40][41] The parliamentary opposition was mostly able to retain its seats in the local elections because the newly organized Tisza Party did not participate in that election – with the exception of Budapest. Klára Dobrev dissolved her shadow cabinet on the next day ^[42] and the DK–MSZP–Dialogue Alliance also ceased to exist in October 2024.^[43][44] While the Tisza Party gradually caught up with Fidesz–KDNP during 2025, and then left it behind in the polls, the parliamentary opposition parties completely eroded.^[35]

In May 2025, former Momentum Movement leader András Fekete-Győr urged his party not to contest in the upcoming parliamentary election, claiming that it would only result in the dispersion of opposition votes. His proposal resulted in numerous statements and discussions in the political public in the upcoming weeks.^[45] In the next month, two opposition parties, the Everybody's Hungary Peoples' Party and the Momentum Movement decided not to run in the next election in the interest of government change.^[46][47] In Summer 2025, the Yes Solidarity for Hungary Movement, which ran with the Hungarian Workers' Party as Leftist Alliance in some constituencies in 2022 decided not to contest in the upcoming parliamentary election.^[48] In January 2026, three other opposition parties – Solution Movement, Second Reform Era Party and LMP – Hungary's Green Party – announced within a week that they will not run in the parliamentary election.^[49][50][51] On 7 February 2026, Dialogue – The Greens' Party, announced their withdrawal from participation after the rapid failure of their new attempt called the Humanists' Party.^[52][53] On 20 February, the Hungarian Socialist Party – which also governed Hungary between 1994–1998 and 2002–2010, and is one of those parties remaining from the change of system in 1990, alongside Fidesz–KDNP – withdrew from the election, saying that an electoral system that amounted to "legalised cheating" (or "legalised fraud", depending on the translation) could only be overcome by uniting behind "the strongest opposition candidate" regardless of party.^[54][55]

Amendment of the electoral law

On 17 December 2024, the National Assembly voted on changes to the constituencies. As a result, the number of electoral districts in Budapest decreased from 18 to 16, while in Pest County the number of districts increased from 12 to 14. Border changes in some parts of Csongrád-Csanád County and Fejér County also happened. The ruling Fidesz–KDNP made the decision citing demographic changes in the 2022 census. According to the opposition, the real goal was to weaken their position in the constituencies, mainly capital ones, where they were previously elected directly.^[56] The changes were accused of amounting to gerrymandering, with the opposition Tisza Party needing to win by around 3–5 points in the national vote in order to get a majority in the Assembly.^[57]

Independents

A total of 31 independent candidates contested the elections.

Parties withdrawing from the election

Individual MPs not standing for re-election

Series of interviews

The final weeks of the campaign were characterized by a series of interviews published in independent media, with various representatives of the state sphere seeking to expose the nepotism, corruption and dysfunctionality of the state run by Fidesz. On 25 March, the Direkt36  [hu] interview of Bence Szabó, a police officer in the unit investigating child pornography crimes, was published, which was recorded in February. The Constitution Protection Office (AH) pressured the National Bureau of Investigation [hu] (NNI) to search through two men's homes – 38-year-old "Buddha" and 19-year-old "Gundalf" –, after receiving an anonymous tip suspecting child pornography. They were IT specialists of the Tisza Party, and no trace of child pornography was found on their seized devices; instead, hundreds of screenshots were found detailing a political conspiracy operation aimed at bringing Tisza down. In the interview, Szabó detailed how the story looked from the perspective of police officers, including the unusual intelligence agency interventions and the recruitment operation against Tisza. He said that the AH took the data from them without the necessary paperwork, and he confirmed that Magyar's ex-girlfriend, Evelin Vogel, was also a member of the team working against Tisza. Szabó claimed that a secret service group was obviously behind the operation against Tisza. After the Direkt36 article's publication, the police searched Szabó's apartment, interrogated him, and initiated proceedings against him for abuse of office. At the same time as Szabó was charged, Direkt36 published his interview. Government propaganda portrayed the two IT specialists as Ukrainian spies, while oppositional figures declared Gundalf and Szabó heroes.^[252][253]

According to the screenshots found, the former IT specialist of Tisza, Dániel "Gundalf" Hrabóczki, was contacted by V. E. (who later appears as "Henry"), who tried to persuade him into granting him access to Tisza's IT infrastructure in order to bring that down, but Gundalf declined and reported this to his colleague. They had a belt with a hidden camera, with the intention of busting the recruiter, but police seized it and charged them with unlawful use of military equipment. On 28 March, the government posted a video of the AH's hearing of Gundalf after the raid. The government and Orbán claimed that he admitted to having been recruited by Ukrainians, despite the fact that he made no such statement. On the 30th, Gundalf gave an interview to 444, saying that he intentionally misled the agents during the AH's hearing. He justified this by claiming he received messages from an unknown "Theo", who said the AH was interfering with the proceedings against them and the AH itself organised the whole case, aligning with what Szabó said.^[253]

On 2 April, an interview on Telex was published with Hungarian Army Captain Szilveszter Pálinkás, who sharply criticized the Orbán government's defense policy. He said that he had attended Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 2020 with the prime minister's son, Gáspár Orbán, who entered without a selection process. Orbán allegedly told him that he had a "divine inspiration" to help African Christians. After their return home, Orbán was given "an office in the Carmelite"; as a first lieutenant, he began planning the Hungarian Army's mission to Chad. According to Orbán, he also expected 50% military losses in connection with the mission.^{[254][255][256]} According to defence minister Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky, the statement was made with political intent, and he wrote that "the Hungarian Defence Forces is an institution independent of party politics, and will remain so."^[257] He later denied that there was a Chadian mission, even though Szalay-Bobrovniczky himself had made several statements about it years earlier and the legislature had voted on it.^[258] On 7 April, Pálinkás claimed in another interview that Szalay-Bobrovniczky made three offers to keep him quiet, which he all declined: a four-year military assignment in New York, appointing him as the commander of a newly created military organisation, and work in filmmaking.^[259]

Fraud accusations before election

Some observers voiced concerns about potential vote rigging by the ruling Fidesz–KDNP government and election interference from other authoritarian countries that support it, with 79% of Hungarians fearing foreign interference in the election according to a Publicus Institute poll.^[261] A late March 2026 poll by the independent pollster Medián had similarly showed that the majority of voters from both major parties believed that the opposing party would commit electoral fraud.^[262] Orbán supporters were alleging fraud before the elections. Opposition leader Magyar's Tisza party had made available its own system for voters to report fraud. Fidesz followed suit by enabling a hotline and a dedicated email address. Fidesz MEP Csaba Dömötör accused the opposition of fraud before saying: "They cry fraud but they are the ones committing it."^[263] Magyar said that he would accept the results before the elections as long as there is no serious electoral fraud, urging voters to report any irregularities they see.^[263]

Russia

According to The Washington Post, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia considered staging a fake failed assassination attempt against Orbán to boost his popular support.^[238] In March 2026, investigative outlet VSquare reported that the Russian military intelligence service (GRU) had deployed a team of "political technologists" to the Russian embassy in Budapest to assist Orbán's re-election campaign. The report, citing European national security sources, claimed the operation was modelled on previous Russian interference campaigns in Moldova.^[264] Following these reports, a group of Members of the European Parliament, including Tineke Strik, Michał Wawrykiewicz, and Sophie Wilmès, submitted a priority question to the European Commission. They requested a formal assessment of whether the Hungarian government's alleged facilitation of such interference violated the democratic principles enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.^[265]

On 8 April 2026, a consortium of investigative journalists published transcripts of calls between Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó and Russian officials. The leaks suggested that Budapest acted as a fifth column within the EU, with Szijjártó allegedly coordinating with Moscow to weaken sanctions and sharing information on Ukraine's EU accession process. These disclosures prompted the European Union to demand an urgent explanation from Budapest. The timing of the leak, occurring 72 hours before the national vote, became a central theme in the final days of the opposition's campaign, which used it to argue that the Orbán government had compromised national sovereignty.^[266]

On 10 April 2026, two days before the election, research published by digital forensics experts and reported by Reuters identified a coordinated influence operation on Telegram. The research indicated that dozens of channels, previously used to spread Kremlin-aligned narratives regarding the war in Ukraine, simultaneously shifted focus to the Hungarian election. The operation promoted pro-Fidesz narratives while accusing the opposition of being "warmongers" who would drag Hungary into a conflict with Russia. Analysts noted that the timing and messaging of the posts were highly synchronized, suggesting a "bot farm" or a centralized command structure. These findings echoed earlier warnings from MEPs regarding the presence of Russian "political technologists" operating out of the Russian embassy in Budapest.^[267]

Ukraine

The Hungarian government accused the Ukrainian government of interfering in the elections, and Magyar and his Tisza Party of attempting to involve Hungary in the Russo-Ukrainian war.^[268][269] Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the president of Ukraine, stated that he hoped that a certain person (presumed to be Orbán) would not veto a European Union loan for Ukraine, otherwise he would "simply give the address of that person to our Armed Forces — our guys can call him and speak to him in their own language."^[270] This comment was condemned by Magyar,^[271] the European Commission,^[272] and António Costa (the president of the European Council).^[269]

Media access

After the election, Magyar claimed that he had been blocked from appearing on public service television or radio since September 2024.^[273]

Total

The following graph presents the average of all polls.

By affiliation

The following two graphs present only the polls that are government-aligned or independent/opposition-aligned, respectively.

Election results

More information Party, Party-list ...

Party		Party-list			Constituency			Total seats	+/–
		Votes	%	Seats	Votes	%	Seats
	Tisza Party	3,385,890	53.18	45	3,333,415	55.26	96	141	New
	Fidesz–KDNP	2,458,337	38.61	42	2,215,225	36.72	10	52	–83
	Our Homeland Movement	358,372	5.63	6	345,252	5.72	0	6	0
	Democratic Coalition	70,298	1.10	0	65,302	1.08	0	0	–15
	Hungarian Two Tailed Dog Party	51,965	0.82	0	38,924	0.65	0	0	0
	National Roma Self-Government	19,203	0.30	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Germans	18,419	0.29	0				0	–1
	National Self-Government of Croats	1,307	0.02	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Slovaks	902	0.01	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Romanians	512	0.01	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Rusyns [hu]	440	0.01	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Ukrainians	379	0.01	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Slovenes [hu]	179	0.00	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Greeks	159	0.00	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Poles	147	0.00	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Armenians	116	0.00	0				0	0
	National Self-Government of Bulgarians [hu]	108	0.00	0				0	0
	Jobbik				7,832	0.13	0	0	–7
	Hungarian Workers' Party–Solidarity Party				4,187	0.07	0	0	0
	Party of Normal Life				328	0.01	0	0	0
	National Unification Movement				249	0.00	0	0	0
	Party of the Centre				247	0.00	0	0	0
	Hungarian Justice and Life Party[i]				196	0.00	0	0	0
	LMP – Hungary's Green Party				163	0.00	0	0	–3
	Direction – The Future Party				109	0.00	0	0	0
	Independents				20,967	0.35	0	0	0
Total		6,366,733	100.00	93	6,032,396	100.00	106	199	0
Valid votes		6,366,733	99.41		6,032,396	99.43
Invalid/blank votes		37,670	0.59		34,327	0.57
Total votes		6,404,403	100.00		6,066,723	100.00
Registered voters/turnout		8,112,646	78.94		7,618,472	79.63
Source: Nemzeti Választási Iroda

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List results

The following shows the calculation of the list seats after the election. To this end the list votes and fractional votes of each party above the electoral threshold are taken into account, with the 93 seats being distributed using the D'Hondt method. No list of national minorities were able to obtain a seat because they did not fulfill the lowered quota of 1/372 of the votes. In this election, that threshold was 26,712 votes.^[281]

Constituency results